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Constructing accounts of organisational failure: policy, power and 
concealment 
 
 
Abstract 
An example of contracting arrangements within the National Health Service (NHS) 
provides the focus for considering accounts of organisational behaviour and failure. 
Public accounts of the outcome are contrasted with information disclosed in 
response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. While the former focused 
on shortcomings in commercial expertise, sometimes at lower levels within 
organisational hierarches, the latter suggests a need to consider the environment of 
social networks and power relationships.  
The data suggest obstacles to information flows across organisational boundaries 
were a contributory cause of failure, but a desire to present the implementation of 
policy in a positive light encouraged subsequent concealment of what Goffman 
described as ‘dark secrets’ (Goffman, 1959/1990). Through this example, the article 
provides an exploratory use of FOIA to examine social processes that frequently 
elude investigation.  
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A belief that competition promotes efficiency and quality of public services has 
prompted increased use of external contracts by Labour, Coalition and Conservative 
Governments. By 2014-15, the NHS spent nearly £7.5 billion on contracts with 
external providers (Department of Health, 2015). Freedom of Information requests to 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG’s) submitted by the Labour Party disclosed 
that, ‘of 5,071 contracts awarded by CCGs 2,098 (41%) went to NHS bodies and 
2,024 (40%) went to private healthcare firms.’ (Campbell, 2015). However, it can be 
difficult to subject these arrangements to effective scrutiny. Asked for details on 
numbers of contracts held, one government Minister responded, ‘the information 
requested is not held centrally. Individual commissioners (clinical commissioning 
groups and NHS England) are responsible for taking fair and transparent decisions 
on the award of contracts to the providers most capable of meeting the needs of their 
populations and providing value for money.’ (Earl Howe, 2014, Hansard,12 May 
2014 : Column WA464 ).  
Official reviews of contracting focus upon implementation rather than underlying 
assumptions about market behaviour. Contracting failures are typically attributed to 
lack of commercial expertise in the public sector, with one account noting, ‘One of 
the main conclusions of the government’s commercial capability reviews was that 
there was insufficient focus on managing the contracts once the deal had been 
signed.’ Urging, ‘greater transparency of performance and costs, and use of open 
book accounting and internal audit’, it suggested there was, ‘a wider civil service 
culture which does not sufficiently value commercial expertise.’ (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2016). 
However, a focus upon commercial skills neglects social relations within which 
markets operate. Social networks and power relationships have particular salience 
as, ‘traditional boundaries between state and market have dissolved’, creating what 
has been described as a ‘revolving-door’ between public and corporate sectors 
(Wilks-Heeg, 2015: 142). For example, after being Secretary of State for Health, 
Patricia Hewett became a Board member of Boots UK Ltd, and of health care 
provider Cinven Ltd (Whyte, 2015). Secretly filmed by a Channel 4 researcher 
purporting to want contact with officials on behalf of a private health company, Hewitt 
commented, ‘You need to have a sort of eye for propriety and all of that . . . But I 
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mean I have regular lunches and coffees and you know, we’re all mates really.’ 
(House of Commons, 2010.)  
To explore the social and political environment in which contracting decisions are 
made, this article offers an account of a NHS service contracted out to a social 
enterprise. Secure Healthcare Ltd (SHL) was awarded a contract in 2007 for the 
provision of prison health care, attracting funding from the Department of Health 
(DH), but collapsed within two years with substantial debts. Defined as a matter for 
the Primary Care Trust (PCT), DH was reluctant to reflect publicly on the episode: 
‘The Department of Health would not comment on the insolvency, but confirmed 
there would be no let-up in its commitment to social enterprise companies being part 
of the "plural and diverse" market delivering health and social services’ (Gould, 
2009). 
Drawing upon the work of Diane Vaughn (1996, 1999) on how things go wrong in 
organisations, the article challenges assumptions that markets typically provide 
effective mechanisms for handling complex information. Information flows can be 
both obstructed and facilitated by social and organisational relationships within which 
markets are embedded. One feature is what Diane Vaughn describes as ‘structural 
secrecy’: ‘the way that patterns of information, organizational structure, processes 
and transactions, and the structure of regulatory relations systematically undermine 
the attempt to know and interpret situations in all organisations.’ (Vaughn, 1996: 238). 
However, informal social networks may frequently co-exist alongside these 
structures, providing largely invisible routes for the exercise of power, through 
shaping the context in which decisions are made. This can include the emergence of 
the ‘normalisation of deviance’ (Vaughn, 1996: 296), a gradual process of adopting 
unacceptable practices which, in the absence of negative consequences, become 
the norm. Neglect of this in official accounts reflects the ‘prestige of authority’ 
(Durkheim in Lukes, 1969) and ‘hierarchy of credibility’, whereby ‘members of the 
highest group have the right to define the way things really are’ (Becker, 1967: 241). 
Accounts will at times be constructed with the intention of concealing sources of 
failure. In an analysis of the 1985 Challenger spacecraft disaster, Vaughn describes 
the communication failings between NASA teams (structural secrecy), but notes, 
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‘after the disaster, it appeared that Marshall managers intentionally concealed 
information’ (Vaughn, 1996: 238). This recalls Goffman’s observation on what he 
called ‘dark secrets’: 
‘facts about a team which it knows and conceals and which are incompatible with the 
image of self that the team attempts to maintain before its audience. . . The audience 
must not acquire destructive information about the situation that is being defined for 
them.’ (Goffman, 1959/1990: 141). 
Constructing accounts of organisational failure involves the ‘mobilisation of bias’, 
(Bachratz and Baratz, 1962: 952), in which, ‘some issues are organized into politics 
while others are organized out’ (Schattschneider, 1960: 71). The organizing out of 
issues contributes to a public discourse in which market failure is attributed to 
technical or exogenous factors, deflecting attention from the social and power 
relations that shape decisions. This article contrasts official explanatory accounts for 
SHL’s collapse with information obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests. Providing access to otherwise concealed ‘back stage’ knowledge (Goffman, 
1959/1990), these allow attention to be given to the performance of what Vaughn 
describes as ‘clean-up work’: 
‘Employees and organisations devote enormous resources to prevent incidents of 
routine nonconformity from being publicly defined as mistake. This, too, is worthy of 
research. The social organisation of clean-up work also has social costs that 
eventually are paid by the public.’ (Vaughn, 1999: 287). 
Power can be constituted through the construction of accounts, as Garfinkel (1967) 
illustrated in an analysis of clinical records. Garfinkel contrasted ‘actuarial records’ 
with those providing a ‘record of a therapeutic contract’ (Garfinkel, 1967: 199). The 
latter highlights what might be expected to form part of this ‘contract’, and Garfinkel 
observed how, ‘various items of the clinic folders are tokens – like pieces that will 
permit the assembly of an indefinitely large number of mosaics’. Elements are later 
selected to ‘make a case’ for clinical activity (1967: 202-203), enabling the use of 
records to support subsequent decisions. A similar point can be made about 
documents obtained in this study. Records were generally kept (with some notable 
exceptions), and used in public accounts to focus upon aspects such as commercial 
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expertise. In contrast, the role of managerial hierarchies and networks, and the 
political context is missing. As Garfinkel observed, records, ‘are integral features of 
the same social orders they describe’ (Garfinkel, 1967: 192). This case study 
suggests that in reflecting the dominant social order, official accounts of SHL’s 
collapse present the, ‘over-communication of some facts and the under- 
communication of others’ (Goffman, 1959: 141). In contrast, information gained 
through FOIA disclosures allows an alternative account, challenging official versions 
in ways that raises important questions about analysis and accountability. 
 
The policy context 
In October 2006, DH’s new Social Enterprise Unit (SEU) announced a ‘Pathfinder’ 
programme to stimulate innovation in service delivery. 381 applications were 
received. Initial sifting was made against three broad criteria: 
‘was it proposing a social enterprise business model?; did the proposal 
have commitment from a commissioner, or a viable commercial financial 
model?; was the proposal for a new service in health and social care or a 
new way of providing an existing service?’ (HC Hansard, 8 February 2007, 
c1207W).   
159 applications were removed in the first sift. Remaining applications were passed 
to Strategic Health Authorities (SHA’s) for regional assessment, a stage that saw the 
removal of a further 177 applications (Royal College of Nursing, 2007). A final review 
by DH identified 26 successful bids. Each would receive support, including start-up 
funding. One of the successful organisations was Secure Healthcare Ltd (SHL), led 
by a former nurse and behavioural therapist with a commitment to mutualism and 
improving prison health care (Gould, 2008). SHL, established as an Industrial and 
Provident Society, proposed to provide and co-ordinate health care services at the 
UK’s largest prison, HMP Wandsworth. DH provided a start-up grant of £130,000. 
SHL had genuine ambitions to improve prison healthcare. Wandsworth prison, 
including its health care services, received a highly critical inspection in 2004 (HMIP, 
2004) and an inspection in 2006 delivered further negative assessments. Prison 
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healthcare transferred from the Home Office to the NHS in the intervening period, 
but the report suggested, ‘The commissioning of healthcare services by Wandsworth 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) was underdeveloped . . . Clinical governance 
arrangements were weak. . . Recruitment and retention of staff was a key problem.’ 
(HMIP, 2006: 46-47). 
The PCT invited external providers to bid for provision of the service, with SHL 
submitting the successful tender, and commencing the contract in July 2007. The 
organisation, chaired by a former SHA chief executive, was launched in May 2007 by 
the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Care Services at The Cinnamon Club 
(SHL, 2009a: 4), a venue described as, ‘the favourite of politicians and television 
producers’ (Independent, 2011) and, ‘a top location where journalists lunch with 
politicians’ (Singh, 2008). Little more than two years later, SHL’s collapse prompted 
Wandsworth Borough Council’s Overview and Scrutiny Committee to express, 
‘particular concern in view of the impending externalisation of PCT provider services 
and the shift to a system in which a much higher proportion of community healthcare 
services will be secured through competitive tendering.’ (Wandsworth Borough 
Council, 2009).  
 
Methodology 
The study was initially prompted by experiences raising questions when I was a Non-
Executive Director in the NHS. Meeting resistance, I moved status from participant to 
researcher, collecting two types of data. The first comprised public accounts relating 
to the SHL contract. This included SHL’s financial accounts, available from the 
Financial Services Agency which had regulatory responsibility for Industrial and 
Provident Societies.   Particular attention is given to a report produced by 
Wandsworth PCT following SHL’s collapse. A search of media reports was also 
undertaken. This was followed by a series of FOIA requests. Writing in the US, Keen 
suggests that the social scientific community’s reliance upon official publications 
limits research data, urging greater use of FOIA requests (Keen, 2004: 5). Keen 
used the US FOIA, introduced in 1966, to obtain disclosure of information held by the 
FBI about sociologists (Keen, 2004). In the UK, a review of the use of FOIA’s in 
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social research suggests it, ‘potentially extends the range of resources available to 
social scientists, and the experience of researchers in other countries suggests that 
it will be capable of providing a viable source of data for social research.’ (Lee, 2005: 
15). Some researchers note limitations, and Brown concludes, ‘FoI is not a cure-all 
to the problems of access and disclosure with which researchers have always 
struggled, but it does give them an important lever when dealing with the traditionally 
secretive agencies of the public sector.’ (Brown, 2009: 90).  
Under UK law, the process of seeking disclosure through FOIA requests involves up 
to five stages. Many months and longer can elapse before the procedure is 
completed: 
1. Request for disclosure 
2. Request for Internal Review 
3. Complaint to Information Commissioner 
4. Appeal to Information Rights Tribunal (Lower Tier) 
5. Appeal to Information Rights Tribunal (Upper Tier) (on points of law) 
In this study, nine out of 23 requests submitted to nine public authorities resulted in 
requests for internal reviews. Two continued to appeals to the Information 
Commissioner and the Information Rights Tribunal. I also submitted requests to 
three organisations for my ‘personal data’ under the Data Protection Act. Analysis of 
the information was guided by four criteria proposed by Scott (1990) for interpreting 
documentary records: authenticity, credibility, meaning and representativeness. All 
records were considered authentic, in the sense of being genuine, but it was 
necessary to consider the purpose for which they were constructed, when they were 
produced and for whom. It was the credibility of the records that is of greatest 
importance. Two dimensions of credibility were considered: ‘the extent which an 
observer is sincere in the choice of a point of view and . . . the attempt to record an 
accurate account from that chosen standpoint’ (Scott, 1990: 22). Sincerity – ‘whether 
the author of the document actually believed what he or she recorded’ – is not a 
guarantee of accuracy (Scott, 1990: 22-23). Comparison of public accounts with 
disclosed information suggested the concealment of ‘dark secrets’, providing a 
means to consider accuracy, sincerity and meaning, including the performance of 
‘clean up work’. 
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By approaching nine NHS organisations, disclosures provide a measure of 
assurance that the information is representative of the decision-making processes. It 
would be unjustified to assume documents relating to a single case study could be 
representative of the extensive contracting-out of NHS services, but features of this 
case suggest a broader relevance. It was part of a large DH-sponsored programme, 
and the effort expended in discouraging my research, described later, directs 
attention to social practices through which power is used to conceal ‘dark secrets’. 
Success will avoid questions.  
Disclosure of information in response to a FOIA request can be in the form of original 
documents, or simply the information itself. In this article all such sources are cited 
as ‘FOIA’. For complete documents, this is followed by the public authority’s name 
and year of original publication, with details provided according to Harvard 
conventions. Where information, rather than a document, was disclosed, this is 
identified by citing the public authority and date of disclosure. This provides sufficient 
detail for others to request the information from the relevant authority, allowing 
opportunity to scrutinise interpretations offered here. 
Two important ethical issues were considered. First, some writers have expressed 
fears that use of FOIA legislation may produce conflict and threaten the goodwill 
required for effective field work. Lee notes, ‘Formal complaints about non-
compliance, whilst legally possible, might, in the context of an ethnographic study, 
produce adversarial field relations.’ (Lee, 2005: 12). Given the origins of this 
research, a change in role from participant to researcher brings a special 
responsibility to ensure integrity in the collection and analysis of data, but having 
failed to obtain information though alternative routes, I judged this an appropriate 
method. The second issue was informed consent. This cannot exist where 
information is disclosed reluctantly in the face of possible challenge through use of 
legislation. There is an analogous relationship with covert observation which can be 
ethically justified in certain circumstances. The caveat normally applied is that, ‘in 
such studies it is important to safeguard the anonymity of research participants.’ 
(British Sociological Association, 2002).  
In this article, names of individuals are excluded, but to apply anonymity to 
organisations would negate the objective of comparing public accounts with 
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information gained through FOIA disclosure. It would effectively maintain 
concealment. Once data is disclosed in response to FOIA requests it is in the public 
domain, and the response from my institution’s ethical approval committee was that 
use of documentary data that has entered the public domain did not raise the usual 
ethical issues applicable to research involving human participants. I judged it 
appropriate to adopt an approach to researching power described by Phil Scraton:  
‘Given the structural determining contexts of power, guarantees of 
confidentiality, privacy and revision cannot be offered to those who 
represent and protect the interests of corporate bodies or state institutions. 
A form of “public interest defence”, more often attributed to investigative 
journalism, should apply to critical research into alleged abuses of 
power. . . the “public interest” ends justify means which, in ethical terms, 
violate the principles of securing informed consent from all participants.’ 
(Scraton, 2004: 191).  
 
Public accounts of failure   
When I raised concerns about the contracting arrangements with my Member of 
Parliament, he was advised these, ‘are about contractual arrangements between 
Secure Healthcare Ltd and NHS South West London. The decision to award the 
contract and financial monitoring are a matter for those organisations.’ (Minister of 
State, 14.11.12). A review by Wandsworth PCT, providing the fullest public account 
of the collapse, highlights shortcomings in commercial expertise, concluding that, 
‘Directors and Officers involved in the original procurement process were not then 
sufficiently experienced in the commercial externalisation of healthcare services to 
recognise the type of inherent risks faced or their extent’ (NHS Wandsworth, 2009: 
19). Nearly seven pages are devoted to an account of the process leading to the 
Evaluation Panel’s recommendation of SHL as preferred bidder. Much of the focus is 
upon technical features of the process, notably the scoring methodology, which 
placed SHL third out of six bidding organisations.  
The review notes concerns about entering the contract that appear to have been 
disregarded. At an early stage in the contracting process a member of the PCT’s 
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finance team informed SHL: ‘The PCT is unable to enter into any financial or 
contractual arrangement with an organisation which has no trading history. Any such 
arrangement would be too much of a risk for the PCT.’ (NHS Wandsworth, 2009: 5). 
This was challenged by SHL, which was advised to, ‘proceed on the grounds that the 
published bid evaluation criteria did not include a requirement of this kind.’ The 
report adds: ‘Not all of the Evaluation Panel members were aware of these issues 
when the bid evaluation was taking place.’ (NHS Wandsworth, 2009: 5). 
Some issues raised during the commissioning process were not fully documented. 
Concerns about ‘structure and governance arrangements’ were raised at a PCT 
Board meeting, but the review notes: 
‘There is no further documentary evidence available that sets out exactly what these 
related to, other than a cryptic reference in one email: “concerns about governance 
and financial flows which we will need to address in the next stage”. But none of 
those interviewed can directly recall exactly what may have been required.’ (NHS 
Wandsworth, 2009: 11). 
A decision to renew the contract was made in the summer of 2009, following a 
presentation by SHL staff of, ‘extracts from their full audited accounts for the year 
ended on 31 March 2008.  These gave no indication of any financial problems.’ 
(NHS Wandsworth, 2009: 13). Certainly, SHL’s Annual Return and Accounts, 
covering the first 14 months of its existence, to 31 March 2008, do not portray an 
organisation in financial difficulty. The income and expenditure account shows a 
turnover of £4,500,424, with expenditure of £4,025,093, and a balance carried 
forward of £475,331. The balance sheet reports liabilities of £765,076 (creditors), 
against assets of £1,228,793, comprising debtors of £452,489 and cash reserves of 
£776,304 (SHL, 2009a).  
However, the review also reveals that some within the PCT were aware of financial 
difficulties. Within ten months of commencing the contract, SHL was submitting 
advance invoices. On 2 May 2008 an invoice requested payment for July, and on 5 
May an invoice was submitted for August. The position worsened, and the review 
describes an, 
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‘apparent lack of awareness of both Finance and Commissioning staff . . .  that as far 
back as July 2008 SHL were stating that they could not cover their wages bill without 
having the following month’s invoice paid in advance.’ (NHS Wandsworth, 2009: 16). 
Suggesting the role of structural secrecy (Vaughn, 1996) limiting information sharing, 
the review notes that the PCT, ‘received no indication from other NHS Partners that 
they were experiencing increasing payment difficulties prior to SHL ceasing to trade’. 
It refers to a, ‘lack of other “rumour” . . . Informal rumours were generally positive, 
and senior PCT staff did not hear rumours of financial instability.’ (NHS Wandsworth, 
2009: 16). Nevertheless, referring to advance payments, concern is expressed about 
the PCT’s, ‘clearly stated contract payment arrangements having been altered 
without the approval of the Director of Finance.’ (2009: 16). Illustrating the 
‘normalisation of deviance’ (Vaughn, 1996: 296), there appears to have been a 
process of adopting unacceptable practices which became the norm. The review 
does not address the question of why procedures were not followed and 
documentary records not created. Explaining the normalisation of deviance requires 
going beyond a focus upon commercial expertise, to explore the role of power and 
networks in shaping the organisational environment in which decisions were made. 
In terms of credibility (Scott, 1990), Wandsworth PCT’s review appears sincere, but 
its accuracy is constrained by an exclusive focus upon the contractual relationship 
between the PCT and SHL. For example, SHL’s Annual Accounts identify £467,000 
received for an ‘X-Ray Project’, and one of SHL’s directors is described as being on 
‘DH secondment’ (SHL, 2009a: 6). No reference to this is made in the PCT review, 
and this information may not have been included in the extracts from the accounts it 
was shown in the summer of 2009. Information disclosed through FOIA requests 
provides a wider perspective. 
 
Concealed information: power, hierarchies and networks 
The focus of Wandsworth PCT’s review upon its own contract is understandable but 
lacks attention to important relationships. These include sub-contracting 
arrangements between SHL and two NHS Trusts, South West London & St George’s 
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NHS Mental Health Trust (SWL&SG), and St George’s NHS Trust (SGNT), together 
with a GP practice. SHL’s involvement with DH receives no mention. 
During its first year of operation, SHL entered a Service Level Agreement with DH, 
‘to oversee the supply and installation of digital X-ray machines in eight prisons in 
England for tuberculosis (TB) screening, and for the TB Find and Treat mobile 
outreach project. . . The funding for these projects was unaffected by Secure 
Healthcare’s voluntary liquidation as they went ahead before the insolvency 
occurred.’ (Minister of State, Correspondence with MP, 10.04.12).  
Information obtained through FOIA requests indicates greater complexity. Initially, 
DH disclosed payments it made to SHL of £25,200 in 2008, and a further £195,500 
in 2009 (FOIA, DH, 22.05.13). These figures did not correspond with SHL’s accounts, 
so a request for further information was pursued through an internal review. This 
resulted in disclosure of three further payments by DH. These were of £248,000, in 
August 2007, of £500,000 in April 2008, and £1,457,682.50 on 4 September 2009 
(FOIA, DH, 23.08.13). The final payment was made twelve days before SHL 
collapsed.  
Payments to SHL of £195,500 in 2009 included £45,500 for staff secondments for 
the period from April 2009 to January 2010 (FOIA, DH, 22.05.13). DH confirmed a 
member of its staff was on, ‘secondment out . . . during the period in question to run 
the TB project as project manager and although he took the title Director of TB 
Projects he was not on the Board.’ (FOIA, DH, 21.08.13). Companies House records 
show two companies registered on 24 October 2009, for which the former DH 
secondee to SHL was a director. Clarification was sought from DH seeking, who 
explained: ‘When Secure Healthcare went into liquidation, two companies were set 
up to deliver the TB projects they were running.’ (FOIA, DH, 21.08.13). This indicates 
more extensive contracting arrangements than suggested in the Minister’s statement 
that the project, ‘went ahead before the insolvency occurred.’ 
Wandsworth PCT’s review does not consider the role of social networks that 
transcend organisational boundaries. These may rest upon a basis of interpersonal 
trust rather than contractual agreements. This is illustrated though two examples: the 
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sub-contracting arrangements established with NHS organisations, and access to 
government funding. 
Unknown to Wandsworth PCT, SHL accrued substantial debts almost from the 
outset. Between the commencement of the contract in July 2007 and the end of 
March 2008, SHL paid SWL&SG £488,268 of £879,603 it was due. Of £142,153.75 
due to SGNT, just £665.00 had been paid. The combined debts amounted to 
£532,822.75. (FOIA, SWL&SG 05.04.13; FOIA, SGNT 30.04.13). A report produced 
by NHS London’s Audit Consortium for SWL&SG noted these debts arose despite 
SHL’s receipt of advance payments: 
‘The PCT . . . often paid in advance.  There was therefore no reasonable 
justification for delays in payment by SHL. . . Wandsworth PCT has 
reported that they were repeatedly asked by SHL to pay early. This 
provided a strong indication of cash flow difficulties at SHL, but this 
information was not shared with the Trust.’ (FOIA, NHS London Audit 
Consortium via SWL&SG, 2011: 8). 
By 31 March 2009, SHL’s debts to the two Trusts had risen to £556,222. When SHL 
collapsed six months later, SWL&SG was owed £525,064 and SGNT owed 
£123,501: a total of £648,565 (FOIA, SWL&SG 05.04.13; FOIA, SGNT, 30.04.13). 
The impact of structural secrecy is illustrated in the PCT’s ignorance of SHL’s debts 
to SWL&SG, while the Trust was unaware of the PCT’s advance payments. But 
other evidence suggests informal networks spanned this divide. The Chief Executive 
of SWL&SG, appointed in July 2006, previously held a senior position at DH for a 
year, prior to which he had been a SHA Chief Executive. His appointment to 
SWL&SG was overseen by the then Chief Executive of SW London SHA, and a 
June 2006 report to the SWL&SG Board noted: ‘The new Chief Executive will meet 
with the current SHA Chief Executive in her new interim role as Managing Director 
for South West London, within the London SHA.’ (Board report to SWL&SG, 29 June 
2006). Later that year, the Managing Director for SW London was seconded to the 
Social Enterprise Coalition to advise on health issues (as NHS reorganisation 
reduced the number of SHA’s), becoming Chair of SHL in 2007. Another executive 
director of SW London SHA became Chief Executive of Wandsworth PCT.  
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Early contract negotiations included discussions between the SHL Chair and the 
Chief Executive of SWL&SG to consider a reduction in payments to the Trust:  
‘The Trust included a 15-20% overhead in their bid price, to cover 
employment related overheads and any contingency.  However, the Chair 
of SHL met the Trust’s Chief Executive to request that this should be 
reduced to about 10%.  This may have involved an element of financial 
risk, or subsidy by the Trust.’ (FOIA, NHS London Audit Consortium, 2011: 
6). 
The report notes: 
‘For a period of more than a year, the Trust provided services at 
Wandsworth Prison without having a signed sub-contractual agreement to 
protect its position.  There were ongoing disputes with Secure Healthcare 
Limited, concerning the Trust’s financial responsibilities and financial risk 
sharing.  There were repeated delays in payment.  However the Trust 
Board was not informed of these difficulties and the consequent risks for 
the Trust.’ (FOIA, NHS London Audit Consortium, 2011: 4). 
Echoing remarks in Wandsworth PCT’s review, the Audit report adds: ‘Documents 
provided to Audit show that some Trust managers informally expressed concerns 
about the suitability of SHL as a partner from an early stage.’  (FOIA, NHS London 
Audit Consortium, 2010: 7).The report recommends formalised procedures for the 
future, with a requirement that financial risks, ‘should be recognised, reported to and 
approved by the Board before proceeding with a tender submission.’ (FOIA, NHS 
London Audit Consortium, 2010: 6).  
A second example arises from SHL’s success securing government funding. While 
there is no direct evidence of the role of personal and social relations, disclosed 
information suggests formal processes may not have been followed. On 31 July 
2008 SHL secured a loan of £400,000 from the Government’s Futurebuilders fund to 
develop capacity, ‘to bid for and deliver upcoming prison healthcare contracts.’ 
(FOIA, Cabinet Office, 19.11.12). The Cabinet Office (CO) explained: 
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 ‘As part of the standard processes in place at the time, in assessing an 
application for investment a risk assessment of a number of areas 
including both the organisation's finances and the proposal finances was 
undertaken. As standard this included a review of previous accounts, 
financial systems, and cashflow forecasts. This risk assessment was 
presented to the External Investment Committee and was one of the 
factors taken into consideration when deciding whether to make an award.’ 
(FOIA, CO, 19.11.12). 
As SHL’s financial accounts were not created and approved until 5 February 2009, 
these could not have been available in July 2008. The Cabinet Office added: 
‘As part of the standard processes in place at the time, current contractors 
were spoken to regarding the services delivered by the applicant. At the 
time of assessment Secure Healthcare's main contract was with HMP 
Wandsworth as such the Investment officer assessing the case spoke to 
the Governor of Wandsworth Prison. This information was presented to 
the External Investment Committee and was one of the factors taken into 
consideration when deciding whether to make an award.’ (FOIA, CO, 
19.11.12). 
But it was Wandsworth PCT, not HMP Wandsworth, which held the contract. When 
SHL collapsed in September 2009, £259,148 drawn down from this loan was written 
off (FOIA, CO, 19.11.12).   
On 4 February 2009, the day before SHL’s accounts were approved, it was awarded 
a second DH grant, of £380,000 to develop a ‘training campus’. This was the 
maximum allowed under EU State Aid rules (FOIA, DH, 06.12.13). ‘The 
Department's records show no indication that they were aware of, or had been made 
aware of, any significant financial risks associated with the organisation when it 
awarded the grant.’ (National Audit Office, personal correspondence, 12.12.12). The 
Health Minister had previously told Parliament that Pathfinder grant decisions would 
involve regional assessment by SHA’s against 11 criteria. These included, a clear 
sense of vision, purpose and innovation; robustness of governance arrangements 
and sufficiency of management capability; and, ‘explicit commissioner support for the 
Final author’s draft of a paper published in Critical Social Policy 2017 Vol. 37 Iss. 4 pp: 520-539, (first 
published online in Dec. 2016).  DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018316681252 
 
16 
 
application, or a clear demonstration that the scheme will be financially viable’ (HC 
Hansard, 8 February 2007, c1207W). FOIA requests were submitted to Wandsworth 
PCT and NHS London seeking information about this process, producing the 
following responses: 
‘NHS Wandsworth was not asked to provide any information or advice to 
the Department of Health and/or NHS London on any awards made to 
Secure Healthcare under the Social Enterprise Pathfinder programme in 
2007 or 2009. The information is therefore not held.’ (FOIA, NHS SW 
London, 15.01.13).  
‘Following relevant searches, I have been informed that NHS London has 
not been able to locate any information relevant to your request and is 
therefore not in a position to disclose information to you in this instance.’ 
(FOIA, NHS London, 13.01.13). 
The NAO reported that, ‘the Department (DH) held monthly progress updates with 
Secure Healthcare Ltd and received written confirmation from them that the grant 
had been spent for the correct purposes. However, there is no evidence on file as to 
whether this information was verified.’ (NAO, personal correspondence, 12.12.12). 
Writing about the training campus on 9 September 2009, in a report to the SHL 
Board, its chief executive acknowledged: ‘We went ahead with (this) development 
without a tested business plan.’ (FOIA, DH, SHL 2009b: 3). He describes, 
‘serious liquidity issues . . . A number of factors have contributed to the 
current crisis position. It is clear we have had poor financial information to 
track our progress and limited cost controls . . . our cost control and 
management data has been poor from day one . . . The grant and loan 
income injections masked the overspending.’ (FOIA, DH, SHL 2009b: 3). 
None of the NHS organisations seemed aware of the scale of the problem until SHL 
went into liquidation one week later. Apart from the two NHS Trusts, estimated £1.5 
million debts included £103,000 owed to HMRC for unpaid PAYE contributions 
(Liquidators Report), and £150,000 due to Wandsworth PCT for services not 
provided (Wandsworth PCT, 2009).  
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Dark secrets and clean-up work 
The final section returns to my starting point, when raising questions about SHL as a 
NHS Non-Executive Director. These resulted in a review by the Appointments 
Commission (AC), responsible for appointing NHS Non-Executive Directors. Largely 
reliant upon public accounts, its report concluded: 
‘The award of the contract and its subsequent management and 
monitoring by Wandsworth PCT was distinguished by poor procedures 
and many failings in management. These have been attributed . . . to the 
inexperience of the PCT’s team in letting of healthcare services contracts.’ 
(FOIA, DH, AC, 2011: 7).  
‘A review of the accounts of Secure Healthcare Limited for the first year of 
its operation show a solvent organisation with sufficient resources to meet 
its liabilities. . . There are weaknesses and the Secure Healthcare bid 
team, I conclude, let down the company . . . The underlying reasons for 
the failure of Secure Healthcare Ltd were typical reasons for business 
failure and they were addressed by the management of the company as 
they arose without success as it turns out.’ (FOIA, DH, AC, 2011: 11). 
 ‘The means by which (DH Pathfinder grant) applications were assessed 
and due diligence conducted from the outset . . . was thorough, 
independent, open and externally reviewed.’ (FOIA, DH, AC, 2011: 6). 
Underpinning this benign assessment is an assumption that the existence of 
regulatory procedures and safeguards guarantees their implementation. 
Commenting upon a failure of SHL to provide a copy of its business plan to 
Wandsworth PCT, the review concludes, ‘such a plan must have existed as it would 
have been a pre-requisite of the (DH) Investment Panel that one was available 
before consideration of a grant or loan request.’ (FOIA, DH, AC, 2011: 8). The AC 
review excludes any consideration of possible departure from rules and normative 
expectations. 
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A reference to the role of the liquidator also illustrates how the existence of general 
systems of regulation and accountability is assumed to provide safeguards. A 
liquidator has a duty to investigate the cause of an organisation’s collapse and 
consider the conduct of its directors. Where there is judged to be culpability, the 
liquidator is required to report this to the Department of Business, Innovation and 
Skills (Insolvency Service). The AC review continues: 
‘The liquidators confirmed that they discharged their duties in both 
respects. Each such report is considered by the Insolvency Service to 
determine whether any action should be taken against any of the directors 
(executive or non-executive). Action would normally be taken where there 
was, for example, evidence of negligence, knowingly trading while 
insolvent, fraud etc. The reports are not made public but actions taken 
arising from the reports are public, especially as they generally include the 
striking off of the director concerned. No such action was taken.’ (FOIA, 
DH, AC, 2011: 10). 
The review’s author describes this as, ‘an important factor in the whole of this affair’, 
evidently unaware of an anomaly identified in a report submitted to the Audit 
Committee of SWL&SG (dated 23 February 2011). Reference to the same statement 
in the Liquidator’s report is accompanied by this comment: 
‘In paragraph 4 of the report, it states that the liquidator was required to 
consider conduct of the company’s directors and make an appropriate 
submission to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skill and had 
discharged their duties. However, on seeking further clarification on that 
point, (name of Liquidator) have now confirmed that there was an error in 
paragraph 4 and that as the company is an Industrial & Providence (sic) 
Society, it is not governed by the Companies Act 1985 but the Industrial & 
Providence (sic) Society Act 1965 and therefore the report normally 
issued to the DBIS was not required.’ (FOIA, SWL&SG, 2011: 3). 
As with Wandsworth PCT’s review, the sincerity of the AC report’s author does not 
guarantee accuracy. Information required for a full analysis was not shared between 
NHS organisations. Of equal significance is the distinction between errors resulting 
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from this ‘structural secrecy’ and subsequent deliberate concealment of mistakes 
(Vaughn, 1996: 238). On several occasions, responses to my research suggested 
the performance of ‘clean-up work’ (Vaughn, 1999), providing examples of how, 
‘officials develop ways both of denying the failure of the institution to perform as it 
should and explaining those failures which cannot be hidden’ (Becker, 1967: 128). 
A request to my employer for my personal data disclosed a complaint about me sent 
to the Vice-Chancellor of Plymouth University. The complainant alleged my concerns: 
‘were initially the subject of an independent review by the Appointments Committee 
(sic). They found no substance to MS’s concerns. Indeed it was highly critical of the 
way he raised them. Given MS was dissatisfied with the outcome he asked the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, and the Information Commissioner, to review his 
complaint. Again, they found no substance to MS’s allegations. His complaint is now 
with the Department of Health. The matter has, also, been in the hands of NHS 
lawyers to deal with for the last two years.’ (24.09.13)  
On one occasion, the NHS lawyer informed me: 
‘You are not an investigator, regulator or statutory body and you have no 
standing from which to require anyone to co-operate with your lines of 
enquiry. None of these people are accountable to you. . . . I am in the 
process of drafting a Protection from Harassment letter to you regarding 
proceedings to seek an injunction against you.’ (Personal correspondence, 
23.04.13).  
A FOIA disclosure request revealed the NHS lawyers were, ‘paid a total of 
£13,788.50 for involvement with your case between 30 May 2012 and 23 August 
2013.’ (FOIA, DH 08.10.13). In 2015, my MP raised with the Chair of the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) contrasts between responses he received from Ministers 
and information disclosed through FOIA requests. The National Audit Office was 
asked to investigate but the PAC Chair subsequently explained that despite, ‘an 
extensive records trawl’, only limited information could be found. The NAO described 
the limited documentation as, ‘less than satisfactory’. Records are normally 
destroyed after six years unless judged to be ‘of value’, and, ‘unfortunately, some 
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records of enduring value were not identified as such at the time and are no longer 
available.’ (Correspondence from PAC Chair, 08.01.16). 
A request for my personal data to the SHA with which I first raised concerns, 
disclosed an early internal communication describing how these should be dealt with. 
It ended with the words, ‘Hopefully this gets put to bed today.’ (02.12.11) 
 
Conclusion 
This study illustrates the contribution FOIA disclosure can make to research into 
contracting arrangements in the public sector. Despite limitations, disclosure of 
concealed data offers a valuable method for exploring hidden aspects of 
organisations, and researching the social organisation of ‘clean-up work’ that 
typically eludes observation. The focus upon detail in this study can now be 
connected with a broader issue of the social embeddedness of markets, and 
implications for understanding the exercise of power. Market reforms in health care 
rest upon neo-classical assumptions on the role of competition, which can present 
an, ‘atomized, undersocialized conception of human action’ (Granovetter, 1985: 484). 
Granovetter also comments on the shortcomings of approaches that acknowledge 
"social influences", but then, ‘construe these as processes in which actors acquire 
customs, habits, or norms that are followed mechanically and automatically, 
irrespective of their bearing on rational choice.’ (485). He proposes an alternative, 
recognising that, ‘attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, 
ongoing systems of social relations.’ (487). More specifically, he suggests, ‘The 
embeddedness argument stresses . . . the role of concrete personal relations and 
structures (or "networks") of such relations in generating trust and discouraging 
malfeasance.’ (490) Arguing it is not contracts but social relations that, ‘are mainly 
responsible for the production of trust in economic life’, he notes scope for negative 
consequences: ‘The trust engendered by personal relations presents, by its very 
existence, enhanced opportunity for malfeasance’ (Granovetter, 1985: 491).  
This approach informs three summary points on the means by which power can be 
exercised through concealment of ‘dark secrets’ using social and personal networks. 
These points align with three stages of the contracting process described in this 
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study. Commencing with contract negotiations (and the role of interpersonal trust), 
these were followed by experiences of contract performance (including the 
emergence of the ‘normalisation of deviance’), and ending with the public 
presentation of accounts of failure (involving concealment of dark secrets and ‘clean-
up work’). 
First, from the outset, social and personal networks existed at a senior level between 
SHL, the PCT, SWL&SG NHS Trust and DH. It took two years to formalise the 
contract between SHL and SWL&SG, but meanwhile informal discussions were held 
involving senior representatives of the two organisations that were not reported to 
the Trust Board. As Granovetter observes, the trust that makes discussions of this 
type possible can have both positive and negative consequences. Some important 
decisions were not formally documented, and information was not shared in 
recorded forms between organisations. While specific circumstances may be unique, 
the example highlights the wider issue of openness about performance of 
contractors in the NHS. Without clear and deliberate arrangements for sharing 
knowledge about contractors to counter the impact of structural secrecy, there is little 
reason to suppose something similar could not be repeated.      
Examples of the ‘normalisation of deviance’ occurred during performance of the 
contract, notably in payment by the PCT for advance invoices, but also by DH in lack 
of rigour in grant-making processes. PCT confidence in arrangements with SHL 
appears to have been boosted by endorsement from those in senior positions. Not 
only was SHL chaired by a former SHA Chief Executive, a review of its relationship 
with SWL&SG noted that a factor making involvement with SHL an attractive option 
for NHS organisations had been the, ‘considerable enthusiasm from the Department 
of Health downwards, for a social enterprise model of care’ (FOIA, NHS London 
Audit Consortium via SWL&SG, 2010: 7). In another context, the culture of 
expectation such enthusiasm can generate has been described by one SHA Chief 
Executive, ‘I’ve got to be able to look over my little kingdom and be able to say that 
the things the Government want to be happening in health care are happening on my 
patch. If the Prime Minister tipped up tomorrow, I could take him to a range of things 
to show how we are modernising the NHS.’ (Storey, 2011: 636-7).This can produce 
a mutually reinforcing process, contributing to ‘group think’, and discouraging the 
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raising of concerns and challenges. There were occasions when less senior staff 
appeared to raise questions about SHL’s suitability, but these were not addressed or 
even clearly documented. Reflecting the ‘mobilisation of bias’, recurring episodes of 
secrecy in the NHS demonstrate the need for more effective support for those who 
raise concerns. 
Finally, power is exercised through the selection of records to construct accounts for 
explaining failure, and simultaneous restriction of access to information that might 
allow alternative interpretations. An emphasis in official accounts upon issues of 
commercial expertise, attributing failure largely to technical matters, implies no wider 
review of policy is necessary. A more open and transparent culture could facilitate a 
genuine review of contracting failures in the NHS. Approaches some advocate for 
patient safety incidents are relevant to episodes of organisational failure. Vincent 
argues that an, ‘incident acts as a “window” on the system’, and, ‘in a sense, the 
particular causes of the incident in question do not matter as they are now in the past. 
However, the weaknesses of the system revealed are still present and could lead to 
the next incident.’ (Vincent, 2004: 242). Organisational failures may have less 
immediate personal impact than patient safety incidents, but nevertheless result in 
real costs that are paid by the public. Far greater openness is required if there is to 
be meaningful public accountability for arrangements established between the NHS 
and external health care providers. 
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